Innumerable examples can be given to illustrate the natural connection (cognatio) between distinct things. ...By what natural connection (coniunctione) and as it were harmony and mutual agreement (consensu), which the Greeks call συμπάθεια, can there be coordination (convenire) between the fissure in a liver and my small fortune, or between my small profit and heaven, the earth, and the nature of things? (Cicero, Div. 2.33-4)

1.1 There are different ways to think about the idea of cosmic “sympathy”. In this paper I want to approach it as a thesis of a fundamental connectedness of all things, and look at how this sort of connexio rerum figures in the work of an early modern thinker, Spinoza (1632 – 1677).

The advent of mechanism as the dominant explanatory paradigm of the early modern period was certainly likely to make the idea of cosmic sympathy look “occult” to natural philosophers. For prima facie at least sympathetic relations seem irreducible to deterministic motions of bodies defined by size, shape and motion alone. Likewise, sympathetic action-at-a-distance seems to evade the basic mechanistic requirement that there be contact for action to occur. In fact, however, many early moderns didn't simply reject sympathy tout court. Instead they undertook to better explain the phenomena that had been deemed 'sympathetic', and to reduce allegedly sympathetic relations to purely mechanistic ones. And so Descartes for example – arguably Spinoza's most important intellectual precursor –

1 Thanks to the volume editors and to the participants of the Sympathy conference at the University of Richmond, especially Eric Schliesser, for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 For resistance to such mechanistic reduction of sympathetic phenomena see More, who posits “a substance incorporeal, but without sense and animadversion, pervading the whole matter of the universe, and exercising a plastical power therein,...raising such phaenomena in the world...as cannot be resolved into mere mechanical powers...[T]he unity of the soul of the universe...and...the continuity of subtile matter...[account for] not onely the sympathy of parts in one particular subject, but of different and distant subjects, ...such as is betwixt the party wounded and the knife...besmeared with the weapon-salve,...which certainly is not purely mechanical but magical” (3.5.1).
writes,

I have deduced the causes - which I believe to be quite evident - of these and many other phenomena from principles which are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position and motion of particles of matter. And anyone who considers all this will readily be convinced that there are no powers in stones and plants that are so mysterious, and no marvels attributed to sympathetic and antipathetic influences that are so astonishing, that they cannot be explained in this way. (Pr 4.187)

In similar spirit, Hobbes (another major influence on Spinoza) tried to explain magnetism – the sympathetic phenomenon par excellence – by reference to infinitesimal motions of bodies.

A similarly deflationary attempt to integrate the ancient and the new is also one of the hallmarks of Spinoza's thought. Spinoza systematically reinterprets received doctrines – what others saw, as he once put it, but only “as if through a cloud” – in accordance with the demands of truly “adequate” thought (that is to say, in accordance with a timelessly true description of the essences and properties of things.) And so in his system the newfangled, mechanistic physics coexists with a Platonic,

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3 Cf. “The sciences, however abstruse [occulta], are to be deduced only from matters which are easy and highly accessible, and not from those which are grand and obscure...To inquire whether a natural power can travel instantaneously to a distant place...I shall not immediately turn my attention to the magnetic force, or the influence of the stars...I shall, rather, reflect upon the local motions of bodies...readily perceivable...nor shall I prattle on about the moon's warming things by its light and cooling them by means of some occult quality. Rather, I shall observe a pair of scales” (Rule 9).

4 “[T]he first endeavour which iron hath towards the loadstone is caused by the motion of that air...contiguous to the iron...generated by the motion of the next air, and so on...till...we find...some motion...in the loadstone itself, which motion...is invisible. It is therefore certain that the attractive power of the loadstone is nothing else but some motion of the smallest particles thereof. ...As for those that say anything may be moved...by itself, by species,...by substantial forms,...by antipathy, sympathy, occult quality, and other empty words of schoolmen, their saying so is to no purpose” (De corpore IV.xxvi.7, xxx.15).

Likewise, Leibniz's notion of a “pre-established harmony” among the perceptions of causally-isolated substances can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the idea of a sympathetic connectedness of all things, although in a less deflationary manner than Hobbes, Descartes or Spinoza. Cf. e.g. “[P]re-established harmony...between all the monads or simple substances...takes the place of that untenable influence of the one on the others” (NE 296); cf. also DM 33: sense perceptions “must necessarily contain some confused feeling, for our body receives the impression of all other bodies, since all the bodies of the universe are in sympathy”.

On Leibniz and sympathy, see Mercer 2001:193f, 354f, and this volume; also Copenhagen 1998:499ff.

See also Hume's invocation of physical sympathy (Treatise 3.3.1.7).

5 E2p7s.

6 Cf. Leibniz's comments about “restoring” and “rehabilitating” the Aristotelian “substantial forms” “in a way that would render them intelligible, and separate the use one should make of them from the abuse that has been made of them” (New System of Nature, 139); cf. Descartes AT 3.506.

7 See E1app; II/79E2p44e2.
emanative metaphysics, as well as with a neo-Stoic ethics.  

Spinoza was also familiar with the traditional concept of cosmic “sympathy”. The term appears in his writings as a label used by others to describe those relations or influences in nature that had appeared to them “occult”, i.e. not fully intelligible. Thus he writes, “it can happen that we love or hate some things without any cause known to us, but only (as they say [ut aiunt]) from Sympathy or Antipathy [sympathia...et antipathia]”. Elsewhere Spinoza describes such 'unscientific' knowledge – that is, knowledge only of effects, but not of their causes – as a knowledge of “conclusions without premises”. For Spinoza as for the Aristotelians causes are the key to intelligibility: things are what they are, i.e. have the properties that they do, because of their causes; thus to adequately know any thing we must know the causes that necessitated its existence and properties. Hence the key axiom, “The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause”. For Spinoza, such perfect causal knowledge of things is not only the epistemic ideal, but something already given in nature: in his view, all things are eternally adequately conceived in God's “infinite intellect”.

This fundamental commitment to the universal intelligibility of all things – most often referred to by scholars as Spinoza's commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) – means that

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8 See II/97ff; E1p17s[I] (II/62); E4app32 (II/276). On Spinoza's emanationist framework cf. e.g. Gueroult 1968:246-97, Viljanen 2008. On Spinoza's Stoic influences see e.g. James 1993.
9 E3p15s; II/152; emphasis added. Spinoza also mentions metaphysical “sympathy” in his early manual on Descartes's philosophy, when he notes that Descartes's commitment to a “real distinction” between parts of matter shows that “Sympathy and Antipathy are to be rejected as false” (DPP 2p8s; I/197). This is presumably because really distinct bodies would be substances, independent from one another. Of course in his own philosophy Spinoza rejects the Cartesian thesis that parts of matter are really (as opposed to merely modally) distinct from one another – as well as the idea that real distinction corresponds to a numerical distinction (cf. E1p10s).
10 E2p28d.
11 Cf. e.g. “nothing belongs to the nature of anything except what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause” (E4pref; II/207).
12 E1ax4. For discussion of the axiom see Wilson 1999.
13 E2p3.
14 E1ax2, E1p11altd1; E1p30. See Della Rocca 2008, 2003 for an account of the role of the PSR in Spinoza's philosophy.
Spinoza's metaphysics is thoroughly hostile to any phenomenon or law of nature that would be in principle inexplicable.\(^\text{15}\) So influences and relations in nature that others may have deemed “sympathetic” – that is, influences and relations known only through their effects, and so not fully or adequately – have to be either completely eliminated from a Spinozistic metaphysics or made fully intelligible. That is, a Spinozist must either reveal the causes on which such purportedly sympathetic effects depend (thus making the influences in question fully intelligible), or show that it is in fact metaphysically impossible for causal relations to hold in a particular case. (For example, for Spinoza causal dependence is possible only within the boundaries of the same kind of being – that is, contrary to what Descartes had thought possible, only bodies can enter into causal relations with bodies, and minds with minds.\(^\text{16}\) So any putative sympathetic influence that crosses from the mental realm to the corporeal realm, or vice versa will turn out to have been illusory on Spinoza's account. Or at least it cannot have been a matter of causal influence. The assertion of a particular sympathetic relation may instead turn out to have been a way of confusedly recognizing that the mind and body in question are in fact numerically identical.\(^\text{17}\))

For Spinoza it is typical of our ordinary cognitive condition that we grasp no more than the effects, but not the causes that ground them, and are forced to resort to this obscure idea of a “sympathetic” influence to try to explain what we experience. He thinks that for the most part we fail to understand the causes at work in nature, and even the causes that govern our own actions and appetites.\(^\text{18}\) Notoriously this is how he understands the origin of our belief in a “free” – i.e. undetermined – “will”. In metaphysical rigour, in his view, all we do happens necessarily, and every

\(^{15}\) This is so even if it is not within the powers of a finite human mind to grasp the entire series of finite causes leading up to a phenomenon in question (TIE[100]). There are also entire realms of being – those that are neither thought nor extension – that are in principle excluded from being known by human minds, i.e. minds defined as representations of extension.

\(^{16}\) E1p3.

\(^{17}\) See section 8.

\(^{18}\) E4pref (II/207); E1app (II/78-9).
action and volition depends on an infinite series of prior causes.\textsuperscript{19}

Spinoza's claim that our belief in free will only reveals our ignorance of natural causality is much emphasized by commentators. But another aspect of his picture of our causal ignorance is neglected. This is that we also try to explain our actions and desires with the claim that we have some “sympathy” or “antipathy” toward some thing. By Spinoza's standards, such an explanation is just as inadequate as an explanation that appeals to free will: it is ignorance to treat nature as if it were a realm of ungrounded influences and a mere aggregate of separate beings. In metaphysical rigour, nature for Spinoza is a genuine \textit{unity}, grounded in a single causal power (that of the one substance or “God”), completely causally deterministic, and thus also thoroughly intelligible.\textsuperscript{20} So although in his reformative approach to the allegedly “occult” notion of a cosmic sympathy Spinoza is merely representative of the philosophical trends of his time, his monistic ontological framework – i.e., his commitment to the existence of only one fundamental entity, of which all other things are merely modifications – makes him particularly well-suited for the task of rehabilitating this notion.\textsuperscript{21} This is because at the heart of the idea of cosmic sympathy is the principle of a fundamental relatedness of all beings. In Spinoza's case, this relatedness follows immediately from his commitment to substance-monism.\textsuperscript{22}

1.2. In the remainder of this paper I want to disentangle the different ways in which Spinoza

\textsuperscript{19} E3p7d; E3p9s; E4pref (II/207); E4def7.
\textsuperscript{20} See E1p16, E1p29, E1p34.
\textsuperscript{21} However, Spinoza would be certainly wary of describing nature as “harmonious”, as some advocates of cosmic sympathy do. According to Spinoza such predicates tell us nothing about things as they are in themselves, only about how they happen to affect us at a particular time or place (cf. E1app; II/78). Spinoza would be equally wary of thinking of sympathetic relations among distinct and distant things as if this served some cosmic end nature as a whole could have, as Plotinus for example does. For Spinoza's rejection of teleology, see E1app; II/80, and Carriero 2005.
\textsuperscript{22} E1def3; E1def5; E1p14; E1p18.

Spinoza also places a lot of emphasis on the \textit{compositional} unification of entities at levels of being 'below' substance. Thus for example he conceives of the entirety of produced corporeal nature as one individual (E2L7s; II/102). Likewise, all human beings are one individual insofar as they “agree” in nature, that is, share properties in common (E41p8s; II/222). I will not pursue these senses of ontological connectedness here.
takes things to be fundamentally connected, i.e. the different ways in which he incorporates this element of sympathetic metaphysics within his own framework.\textsuperscript{23} 

Spinoza discusses the idea of a connection of things at length in one of the most important passages in the \textit{Ethics} – E2p7, corollary and scholium. The claims he puts forward there are usually referred to by scholars as Spinoza's statement of his “parallelism doctrine”. However, as has often been noted, “parallelism” is not Spinoza's own term,\textsuperscript{24} and, in my view, reliance on it is harmful because it obfuscates the doctrine. This is because the word “parallelism” suggests some sort of correspondence or isomorphism;\textsuperscript{25} in fact, however, as I will show in what follows, the fundamental relations at stake in the passages in question – E2p7,c, s – are relations of identity.\textsuperscript{26}

This is the first main claim I want to make in what follows. The second main claim I will make is that to grasp Spinoza's distinctive conception of the \textit{connexio rerum} as expressed in these passages we need to make use of the Cartesian (and Scholastic) categories of “formal” and “objective” reality. But before I can argue for either of these points in detail, I need to provide us with the necessary background: a very brief outline of the basic building blocks of Spinoza's metaphysics – substances, modes, and attributes. This will be the task of the next section. Readers familiar with Spinoza's metaphysics should feel free to skip directly to section 3.

\textsuperscript{23} For an account of how Spinoza understands sympathy in his ethics, see Hanley, this volume. 
\textsuperscript{26} Others have argued that 'parallelism' is misleading because it suggests a single doctrine while in fact E2p7 and associated passages advance two distinct doctrines, one concerned with representation, the other with identity. The two doctrines are often described as a blind (or ontological) parallelism and a representational (or epistemological) parallelism. See Deleuze 1990:113ff, Della Rocca 1996:19, 2008:90ff; Donagan 1980:180ff; Melamed 2012:4ff; Nadler 2003:124.
2. The pillar of Spinoza's ontology is his aforementioned substance-monism, or the doctrine that there is only one fundamental entity, which Spinoza calls the “absolutely infinite substance” or “God”, and which is defined by existential and conceptual self-sufficiency.\textsuperscript{27} Everything else that exists – and according to Spinoza there necessarily exists an “infinity” of things – is merely a dependent property (or modification) of this fundamental entity, distinct from substance and from one another only in the way that a property is distinct from the thing it qualifies.\textsuperscript{28} This sole possible substance and its dependent modifications (or “modes”) exhaust Spinoza's ontological inventory: they are the only two metaphysically possible kinds of entities.

From the perspective of an early modern like Descartes, Spinoza's conception of substance is perhaps most peculiar in that he does not take substance to have a single essential nature, despite the fact that it is numerically one.\textsuperscript{29} Instead, according to Spinoza, substance – and, derivatively, its modes – possesses multiple, heterogeneous essential natures.\textsuperscript{30} These natures – which Spinoza, following Descartes,\textsuperscript{31} calls “attributes” – are contained in substance without contravening its ontological unity and so giving rise to distinct substances. Thus Spinozistic substance is equally essentially at least a thinking thing and an extended thing. The same is true, derivatively, of all its finite properties: each is at least a mind \textit{and} a body. For all we know substance and its modes may very well have still other essential natures, given that it necessarily has all possible natures. But all \textit{we} are able to know of being, according to Spinoza, is extension and thought: in his view we are essentially knowers of extended things.\textsuperscript{32}

Spinoza identifies each of substance's attributes by means of a principal concept. Each of these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} E1def3, E1def6.
\item \textsuperscript{28} E1d5, E1p14, E1p16, E1p18.
\item \textsuperscript{29} See Descartes, \textit{Pr} 1.53.
\item \textsuperscript{30} E1def6.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Pr 1.53.
\item \textsuperscript{32} See E1def6, E2ax5, E2p13, Ep. 64.
\end{itemize}
concepts represents the property which all modes under the given attribute presuppose for their intelligibility.\textsuperscript{33} For example, all particular ideas, volitions, doubts presuppose the concept of “thought”; all particular bodies, movements, rests, that of “extension”. Different attributes thus by definition have no common conceptual denominator.\textsuperscript{34} As a consequence, given Spinoza's aforementioned commitment to the intelligibility of all things, entities under different attributes – for example, a particular body and a particular mind – cannot enter into causal relations.\textsuperscript{35} This is because such an event would be, Spinoza thinks, fundamentally inexplicable. For this reason, in his eyes it is also metaphysically impossible: all causal connections have to be underwritten by conceptual connections.

3. With this sketch of Spinoza's basic metaphysical framework in place, let us return to his interpretation of a core ingredient of the notion of cosmic “sympathy”: connexio rerum. E2p7 contains Spinoza's fundamental statement on the subject:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things [\textit{Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum}]. \textit{Dem.}: This is clear from 1ax4. For the idea of each thing caused depends [\textit{dependet}] on the knowledge [\textit{cognitione}] of the cause of which it is the effect.

I will approach this passage by looking at its components, starting with the idea of the “order and connection” of things. (Since for Spinoza there seems to be no significant difference between the notions of “order” and “connection”,\textsuperscript{36} I will use them interchangeably in what follows.)

First, the demonstration of E2p7 makes clear that the “connection of things” being described in E2p7 is a connection of \textit{things qua causes}. That is, the \textit{connexio rerum} at stake here is a connection of

\textsuperscript{33} Cf. Descartes Pr I.53.
\textsuperscript{34} It would be more accurate to say that different attributes have \textit{insufficiently} in common, or that what they have in common they have in common in the \textit{wrong way}. For \textit{abstractly} of course all attributes have that in common that they can be classed together under universals like “attribute” or “expression”. (For Spinoza on abstraction and universals see my [forthcoming a].)
\textsuperscript{35} E1p3.
\textsuperscript{36} In E2p7s (II/90) and E3p2s (II/141) for example Spinoza suggests their synonymity with the help of the conjunction \textit{sive}. 
causes and effects, of things standing in relations of causal dependence.

If we draw on what Spinoza says elsewhere in the *Ethics*, we can characterize this causal *connexio rerum* more precisely. Three of its features deserve attention in particular. First, for Spinoza all *res* (including substance itself) are causally dependent on the one substance: they are all brought into existence by the essence of substance insofar as it is an absolutely infinite causal power, and also essentially *are* determinations of this power.\(^{37}\) Secondly, every “thing” is a cause: “Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow”.\(^{38}\) So all modes are not merely the *effects* of the one substance, essentially dependent in their nature and existence on that substance; more precisely they are effects by means of which this substance brings about still *further* effects. Since all things are causes, and (by PSR) all things (including substance) *have* causes, we can conclude that for Spinoza only what can enter into causal relations is a being (or, equivalently, has a degree of metaphysical “reality”).\(^{39}\) For this reason, for Spinoza a comprehensive characterization of causal relations in nature will encompass *all* beings without exception. In other words, the “causal order of nature” has for him the same extension as the “order of things” or “beings”. Moreover, E2p7 suggests that it is this causal sense of *connexio rerum* that is for Spinoza the principal, if not the only, sense in which things in nature are fundamentally connected.

The final feature of the causal *connexio rerum* that merits mention has to do with the way that *finite* things are causally dependent. Like all things, each finite thing is a necessary consequence of God's essence (so not, as for many other philosophers, a consequence of God's free will to create). But

\(^{37}\) See E1def1, E1def6, E1p34, E3p7d.

\(^{38}\) E1p36. However, Spinoza also describes “relations” as not real, but as merely ideal (cf. e.g. KV1.10[1-3]; II/49). Are we to understand that causal relations are not real for Spinoza? (He uses “relation” in a causal context e.g. in KV 1st Dial; II/30). Given how fundamental ontologically causal relations are for Spinoza, this would be a fatal conclusion for his metaphysics. I suggest that Spinoza must be implicitly distinguishing causal relations from “relations” due to the intellect, i.e relations which are generated only because the relate have been related by an intellect. Unlike the latter, causal relations require for their being no operation of the intellect, nor any universals that permit such an operation to take place.

\(^{39}\) See E2def6; E1p9; E1p8s.
for Spinoza no finite thing is an *immediate* consequence of substantial nature. Instead each finite thing depends on prior members of an infinite series of finite causes and effects, and it is this whole infinite series that is an immediate consequence of substance's nature.\(^{40}\) In other words, a finite thing's causal dependence on substance is mediated by its dependence on other finite things: every finite thing is causally dependent on an infinite series of prior finite causes which determine that, and how, it exists and what effects it must produce.\(^{41}\) Given Spinoza's aforementioned causal requirement on adequate knowledge, this means also that no finite thing can be truly *known* apart from other finite things. In this sense for Spinoza, as for some earlier advocates of sympathy, things that prima facie appear distinct and distant can be shown to be in metaphysical rigour causally and hence also explanatorily necessarily related.

4. So much for how Spinoza understands the causal order of things. The second component of E2p7 is the idea of an order and connection of *ideas*. It is worth flagging at the outset that Spinoza understands the nature of “ideas” (or “thought”) quite differently from what we might today understand by these terms. In large part this is because Spinoza views thought as a universally predicable property, insofar as he takes all things – pebbles, dragonflies, pinball machines – to be “minded” (even if the thinking that these different minds engage in is characterized by different degrees of complexity and autonomy).\(^{42}\) This thesis of universal mindedness follows from Spinoza's (notorious) identification of a thing's “mind” with God's idea of this thing. With this identification in place, universal mindedness follows straightforwardly from Spinoza's entirely orthodox commitment to divine omniscience.\(^{43}\) But,

\(^{40}\) E1p28; McCracken (1998:816). This infinite series is the so-called mediate infinite mode (E1p22).

\(^{41}\) To put this from the point of view of extension, what individuates a particular body for Spinoza is a certain proportion or pattern \([\text{ratio}]\) of motion and rest among constituent bodies (E2def8; II/99); but it is other bodies that determine that a given proportion in fact necessarily obtains.

\(^{42}\) E2p13s (II/97).

\(^{43}\) E2p3.
as a consequence, what we today may associate with “thinking” is from Spinoza's point of view not the whole of thinking, nor the essence of thinking as such, but instead only our experience of the degree of thinking proper to human beings – the sorts of ideas that we are capable of producing. The properly Spinozistic vantage point on “thought” requires us to think of it as a property that belongs first and foremost to the infinite first cause that connects, generates and explains all other things.  

Let's now turn back to E2p7, and the notion of a “connection” of ideas. The proposition describes this connection of ideas as “one and the same” as the causal order of things. There are two questions here. First, how are we to understand the very notion of a connexio idearum? Second, in what sense exactly is this connexio idearum “one and the same” as the connexio rerum? Answering these questions will allow us to further illuminate Spinoza's conception of the connectedness of things.  

In response to the first question, arguably the most obvious answer is that what Spinoza means by an “order of ideas” is a purely logical order, constituted by relations of entailment or inference among propositions. On this reading, E2p7 would assert the existence of some sort of isomorphism or correspondence of the (causal) order of things with a purely logical order (of ideas). This is certainly a popular reading of the proposition. There are however reasons to demur. In the first place, a rudimentary difficulty for this sort of reading is that Spinoza has almost nothing to say about logic in general, or about the nature of inference in particular. The little he does say on these topics suggests that like many other 17th century thinkers, Spinoza thought of logic as a normative and therapeutic “art” akin to medicine. That is, he did not belong to that philosophical tradition for which logic is

44 Cf. Melamed 2012:43. On Spinoza on human nature and kinds more generally, see my (forthcoming a). That Spinoza regards the production of “ideas” as synonymous with “thinking” is suggested e.g. by E2def3.

45 The next 3 paragraphs are developed more fully in my (forthcoming b).

46 Bennett for example asserts that for Spinoza “a cause relates to its effect as a premise does to conclusion which follows from it” (1984:§8.3) ; Curley, similarly, claims that “Spinoza assimilates the relation of causality to the relation of logical implication” (1969:45-6).

47 Cf. Donagan 74-5.

48 See E5pref (II/277); CM1 ( I/233).
concerned with being qua known. So logical relations seem a rather poor candidate for constituting an order capable of being the “same” as the causal order of things.\textsuperscript{49}

However, the real problem with such purely logical interpretation of the Spinozistic \textit{connexio idearum} lies elsewhere. The problem is that if we assume that E2p7 asserts some sort of isomorphism or mirroring of causal dependence relations on the one hand, and entailment relations between propositions on the other, classical models of inference fail to generate only those relations of causal dependence that Spinoza in fact accepts in his metaphysics.\textsuperscript{50} That is, if we assume that effects in Spinozistic nature “follow [sequi]” from their causes along the lines of either material or strict implication, we end up attributing to Spinoza causal views he cannot hold. Take, for example, the proposition “God exists”. For Spinoza this is a necessarily true proposition. As a true proposition, it is materially implied by any proposition; as a necessary proposition, it is strictly implied by any proposition. So if either of these models of inference reflected how Spinoza understood causal dependence, he would be committed to the view that God’s existence is caused by the existence of any thing. But it is of course a fundamental tenet of Spinoza’s system that God is \textit{causa sui}: his existence follows from his essence alone.

So there are at least two reasons to hesitate before identifying the Spinozistic \textit{connexio idearum} simply with entailment or inference among propositions as classically understood. Clearly it is necessary to further restrict the set of relevant entailment relations, so as to exclude what to Spinoza are metaphysically impossible causal dependencies. More specifically, I suggest that to adequately model logically the relations of causal dependency in Spinoza’s metaphysics we must restrict the set of relevant entailment relations to entailment relations \textit{from essences to properties} implied by those

\textsuperscript{49} Cf TIE\textsuperscript{91}.
\textsuperscript{50} Garrett was the first to point out this difficulty; his own solution to the problem is relevance logic (1991:194). Cf. also Della Rocca 2003:81, 92n12. For a more detailed treatment of this problem see my (forthcoming b).
essences.\textsuperscript{51} To give a traditional example from Euclidean mathematics, a triangle’s essence, as given by its definition, will imply for instance that the sum of the triangle's internal angles equals two right angles.\textsuperscript{52} In the same way, a real thing's essence, as stated in its definition, will according to Spinoza imply all the properties that necessarily follow from \textit{its} nature, or are analytically contained in its definition.\textsuperscript{53} This way of narrowing down the relevant entailment relations supplies the missing metaphysical constraint on which relations of conceptual dependence, among all those possible on classical models of inference, are genuinely metaphysically possible for Spinoza: namely, only those that hold between the divine essence or definition and the properties this definition analytically contains, and between the essences of those properties and \textit{their} properties. To return to our earlier test case, this prior metaphysical constraint rules out the possibility of inferring from truths about modes to the truth of God's existence.

5. We have then one possible answer to our first question about E2p7 – how to interpret the notion of a “connection of ideas” within Spinoza's metaphysical framework. Let us then tackle the second question: in what sense exactly is this \textit{connexio idearum}, now understood in terms of essence-to-property entailment relations, “one and the same” as \textit{connexio rerum}, as Spinoza claims in E2p7?

The way Spinoza demonstrates this proposition suggests that he sees this “sameness” as following immediately from the causal requirement on knowledge, set down in E1ax4. The brevity and purported self-evidence of this demonstration has caused much consternation to scholars.\textsuperscript{54} But the general line of thought behind the demonstration is arguably clear enough. Namely, if adequate

\textsuperscript{51} Spinoza defines “essence” as a set of properties necessary and sufficient for a thing to be what it is, and which obtain only when the thing itself obtains (E2def2). For a more detailed account of Spinozistic essences, see Garrett 2002 and my (forthcoming a, b).

\textsuperscript{52} See Euclid's \textit{Elements}, proposition I.32; for a more detailed account see Mancosu 14.

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. E1p17s1, E1p16, E3p7d.


As has been often noted (e.g. Curley 1988:64; Deleuze 1990:114-5, Della Rocca 1996: 22-3, Wilson 1999:154), for the demonstration of E2p7 to go through we must arguably assume E2p3, i.e. the existence of ideas of all things, despite Spinoza's failure to mention E2p3 in E2p7d.
knowledge of things requires adequate knowledge of their causes, then any adequately knowing intellect must represent in its ideas the same causal order of things as that which in fact obtains in nature. So we might be inclined to read E2p7's assertion that ideas depend on one another in “one and the same” way as things qua causes do, as Spinoza's implicit endorsement of a version of the correspondence theory of truth: substance qua thinking, as an omniscient and perfect knower, reproduces or mirrors in the relations among its ideas the relations of causal dependence that obtain among res in nature. Yet whatever its other merits, this sort of gloss of E2p7 does not genuinely answer our second question. For it hardly clarifies matters to say that the connexio rerum and the connexio idearum are “one and the same” in the sense that they “correspond to” or “mirror” one another. This merely pushes the question back, without shedding much light on how two, prima facie entirely heterogeneous sorts of relations – relations of causal dependence on the one hand and relations of essential implication on the other – could be compared, not to mention judged to have the “one and the same” order.

Of course, the correspondence-theory reading is not the only way to gloss the unity and sameness asserted in E2p7. Among the options, there is what we could call a reductive reading, on

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55 I do not mean to suggest that Spinoza's other uses of E1ax4 are restricted to cases of adequate knowledge. See especially Wilson 1999.
56 This sort of reading of E2p7 does not require us to assume that there is a one-to-one relation between things qua causes in nature and the ideas representing these causes (pace Bennett 1984:§31.1; Curley 1988:63, 67; Della Rocca 1993:198, 1996:18; Melamed 2012:2, Wilson 1999:153). All that is required is that for each effect its complete cause be represented. How many ideas it may take to do that can presumably vary from case to case. God's idea is presumably simple (cf. E2p8s, CM 2.7). To take an example from finite cognition, in reasoning [ratio], unlike in “intuitive” knowledge, a mind can adequately represent infinitely many particulars by means of a single idea, since reasoning involves forming adequate universal notions. In other words, I do not believe that Spinoza is committed to saying a priori how many ideas, and what sorts of ideas, are necessary for any representation to be adequate. For this reason I do not believe that he is committed to saying a priori how in any particular case the ideas representing the relevant causal relations will be ordered, i.e. related to one another.

See E2p40s2 (II/122). For a fuller account of this reading of Spinoza on reason and universals see my (forthcoming a).
57 Wilson glosses this “sameness” as a single “relation of necessary determination” that obtains between “physical things” and “cognitiones” alike; however she also concludes that this doesn't tell us much about the nature of this relation (1999:155). Della Rocca suggests this sameness boils down to a “structural similarity”, such as having the same “number of immediate effects” (1996:18).
which the connexio rerum and the connexio idearum are “one and the same” just in the sense that there is really only one order. Della Rocca's idealist interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics can be seen as one version of this reductive approach. Della Rocca takes Spinoza to reduce causal relations to logical relations between ideas.\textsuperscript{58} On this reductive-idealist account, the connexio rerum and the connexio idearum would be “one and the same” just in the sense that the only order governing nature is the logical order of ideas.

This reading certainly provides a more precise gloss of “unity” and “sameness”. Unfortunately, the idealist interpretation as a whole is beset by formidable difficulties. (Most importantly perhaps, it seems inconsistent with Spinoza's explicit commitment to multiple attributes, including an “extended” nature conceivable “through itself”, and thus it would seem precisely not in terms of thought.)\textsuperscript{59} Because of these general difficulties with idealist readings of Spinoza, it seems advisable to look for a different gloss of reading of “unity” and “sameness” asserted in E2p7.

Another interpretative option we have is a reductive reading of this phrase that operates in the opposite direction that the idealist one so to speak, i.e. a reading on which the order of causes and the order of ideas are “one and the same” just in the sense that all relations of ideas reduce to causal relations between things.\textsuperscript{60} This causal version of the reductive reading is certainly encouraged by the fact that for Spinoza “res” is a perfectly general ontological category. As such it includes “idea” in its scope. From this vantage point, it is self-evident that relations between ideas will be “one and the same” as relations between “things”, since an “idea” is just a certain kind of “thing”. The reductive

\textsuperscript{58} An Aristotelian would interpret this “sameness” as the adequatio, or formal identity, of the object being known and of the intellect which receives the intelligible form of the object. (Cf. e.g. Aquinas, ST I q80 a1.) 58 2003:92n12.
\textsuperscript{59} E1def8, E2p2, E1p10. Della Rocca also treats substance and mode as if Spinoza had defined them solely in terms of how they are conceived (2003:81-3), thus neglecting (or making redundant) the inherence, or being-in clauses of Spinoza's definitions (E1def3, 5). For further criticisms of Della Rocca's reading see my (forthcoming b); Laerke 2011.
\textsuperscript{60} This seems to be the view in Melamed 2012:8.
causal reading is also suggested by at least one passage in which Spinoza himself glosses E2p7, writing

the order and connection of ideas (by [2]p7) is the same as the order and connection of causes. *Therefore, the cause of one singular idea is another idea, or God, insofar as he is considered to be affected by another idea; and of this also [God is the cause], insofar as he is affected by another, and so on, to infinity (E2p9d; my ital.)*

The suggestion here seems to be the “order and connection” of ideas is simply that of causal dependence: i.e, there is nothing more to the ordering of ideas than their causal dependence qua things.  

However, some passages in Spinoza's writings suggest that no version of the reductive reading of E2p7 can be correct, and that instead the *connexio rerum* and the *connexio idearum* are irreducible, of equal metaphysical significance. Consider for instance the following:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (by 2p7), and vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas (by 2p6c and [2]p7). (E5p1d)

E2p6c establishes that the the principle according to which things other than ideas are generated is independent from thought; it thus clarifies that the order of things is not the same as order of ideas because of the dependence of things on ideas (as on theologies according to which God creates the world on the model of ideas preexisting in his intellect). In short, the picture painted in the above passage seems to be of two autonomous orders, standing in a perfectly symmetrical relationship.

6. We seem then to be at an impasse: it appears possible to read the unity and sameness of the

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61 One might think that Spinoza's habit of modeling causal relations in nature on relations of ideas – in particular, modeling substantial causality on relations of inference of properties from the essences of geometrical figures (see e.g. E1p17s) – counts against the reductive causal reading of E2p7, insofar as it suggests that the order of ideas constitutes an independent standard by which we can determine how things in nature depend on each other causally. But in fact the most passages like E1p17s entitle us to conclude is that this is how in Spinoza's view we can grasp the nature of causal relations. This is a matter of the order of knowing, and perhaps even solely of Spinoza's pedagogical strategy. It doesn't mean that in the order of being relations of ideas are not reducible to causal relations.

On the significance of Spinoza's geometric causal analogies see my (forthcoming b) and Vilijanen 2008.
causal/real and conceptual orders asserted in E2p7 in at least three different ways (as correspondence, and as two different kinds of reduction). But there seem to be problems with each reading, and no decisive evidence in favor of any of them. I want to suggest that we look elsewhere for a solution. Namely, I want to propose that to understand the relation between the causal/real and conceptual orders asserted in E2p7 we draw on the Scholastic and Cartesian distinction between “formal” and “objective” reality. This way of approaching E2p7 is suggested by the corollary Spinoza appends to the proposition:

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\text{From this [i.e from E2p7] it follows that God's [NS: actual] power of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting. I.e., whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection.} \] (E2p7c)

Let me first briefly clarify the technical terminology on which Spinoza relies in this passage. The Scholastic and Cartesian notion of the “formal reality” refers to what a thing is in its intrinsic nature, as an extended thing, for example, or a thinking one. The “objective reality” of a thing refers in turn to what a thing is qua represented in thought. To borrow Descartes's example from the First Replies, the sun qua formally real is characterized by certain bodily properties, a certain mass and size among them. But on this conception of “reality”, the sun exists not only in nature, as a particular, formally real body, but also in thought whenever some mind represents it. As the content of an idea, and the product of a mind's power to think, this objectively real sun has a certain reality, proper to the being of intentional objects. As Descartes himself puts it, “the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect”, “in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect” (AT 7.103). The twist Spinoza puts on this traditional conception of reality is that in his view formal reality comes in infinite, or all possible, kinds, not just the two – extension and thought – acknowledged by Descartes.\(^{62}\)

\(^{62}\) See E1def6.

For Spinoza the distinction between the two different kinds of realities presumably belongs to the nature of thought as such, and so to the essence of substance qua thinking, which essence is conceived through itself
With these terminological clarifications in place, let us return to the corollary. The corollary makes a claim about the relation of the whole of formal reality (substance and modes alike, under all attributes) to the objective reality of substance's "infinite idea" and its consequences, i.e. to the objective reality of substance's perfect representation of its own essence and of its modes. This is the fundamental connexio idearum in Spinoza's nature: the infinite idea representing all that is, and the implications of that idea. The claim made in the corollary is that substance qua thinking adequately represents whatever formally-real effects it gives rise to qua first and universal cause. So whatever has formal reality in nature also has objective reality in God's idea of nature – or, whatever has reality at all has at the same time both formal and objective reality. But to say that the content of substance's representations consists in all that has formal reality but now existing with objective reality, is to say that it is the same things existing in two different ways, just as Descartes's sun exists both in nature and in the intellect.

This explains why the corollary asserts the "equality" of substance's two fundamental causal "powers", of the power of thinking and the power of acting. The order of ideas (what must be represented by substance qua omniscient thinking thing) and the order of things (what must be produced by substance qua first and universal cause) are equal in their respective degrees of reality. The effects (ideas) produced by substance's potentia cogitandi together represent as much (the same degree of) being or reality as is in fact possessed by all the effects (things) generated by substance's potentia (E1def3). So it's plausible that in Spinoza's view the distinction between formal and objective reality is also in some sense conceived through itself and so not further explicable with the help of some other, more basic concepts.

63 Derivatively, the corollary is also giving an account here of the ideas had by (more accurately: constituting) finite minds, since for Spinoza these are just "parts" of the infinite substantial idea (E2p11c).

64 Cf. Deleuze 1996:117.

Cf. "A true idea must agree with its object (by [1]ax6), i.e. (as is known through itself), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature" (E1p30d). Cf. TIE[91].

Just as substance's infinite idea is all that has formal reality existing with objective reality, each finite mind is its intentional object (whether a body or a thing existing under some other attribute) existing with a determinate or limited degree of objective reality.

65 On the significance of these two powers, and their relation to attributes, see Deleuze 1996:113ff.
So, unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not see objective reality as a “mode of being...much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect” (AT 7.103; emphasis added). For Spinoza it is a matter of two different but equal ways of having reality – just as attributes are different but equally adequate ways of conceiving of substantial essence.

It is thus not enough to say, as some scholars do,\(^6\) that the corollary is concerned solely with a “representational parallelism” or solely with epistemological relations, but not with ontological matters of identity, with identity becoming a topic of concern only in the scholium that follows the corollary. It seems to me that in fact in the corollary the epistemological and ontological concerns are inseparable, insofar as for Spinoza, like for Descartes, being represented is a certain kind of existence – qua objectively real. To be sure, as has been pointed out before,\(^7\) in the corollary there is no question of identity of the relata qua formally real: the whole of formal reality – which includes the “absolutely infinite” substance – cannot, qua formally real, be identical with an idea representing this substance's essence. For, like any idea, this idea is merely a mode, and so qua formally real it cannot be numerically identical with a substance. Nonetheless, the corollary does on the reading here proposed assert the identity of the formal reality of all that is with the objective reality of substance's idea: both are absolutely infinite. Indeed, it is one and the same absolutely infinite object taken first in its formal reality and then in its objective reality.\(^8\)

7. What I would like to show now is that clarifying the meaning of the corollary in this way

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6 E.g. Melamed 2012:6, 16.  
8 Formally, the corollary is a consequence of the proposition. Like the proposition, it asserts the existence of “the same order and...connection”. However, it predicates this “same order” of slightly different relata. We can safely assume that what the corollary calls the 'order of things following formally from substance's essence' is the very same thing as what the proposition describes as the 'causal order of things'. But what this is being compared to – thought – figures slightly differently in the proposition and in the corollary: the corollary unlike the proposition restricts itself to the objective reality of ideas, and so to the order of represented contents. Presumably, the corollary is a corollary of the proposition precisely insofar as the scope of its concern is narrower.
finally puts us in a position to answer our second question – to wit, the question of the sense in which the *connexio idearum* could be “one and the same” as the *connexio rerum*, as Spinoza asserts in E2p7. For this purpose at least, the corollary is more illuminating than the official demonstration of the proposition.

I take the corollary to suggest that the sameness and unity of the conceptual and causal/real orders are meant to refer neither to a correspondence of these two orders, nor to a reduction of one to the other, but rather to an *identity of entities existing in two different ways, i.e., with two different kinds of reality*. In other words, I suggest that we read E2p7 as asserting that the order of ideas (what must be represented by the infinite substance qua thinking) and the order of things (what must be produced by substance qua universal first cause) are “one and the same” insofar as the *things* existing in these two ways are *identical*: the “sameness” and “oneness” refer, I suggest, specifically to the *identity of the properties and the identity of the degrees of reality* of things existing in these two ways. In other words, “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” for Spinoza insofar as whenever we can truly say of the order of things endowed with formal reality that ‘\(x\) has property \(F\) or degree of reality \(G\)’, this will be equally true of the order of substantial ideas. (Thus for example, it is true of the sun that it has a certain diameter both when it exists in the way that formally-real objects exist in nature, and when it exists in the way that intentional objects exist in thought, when represented by a perfect knower). So, contrary to the reductive readings proposed above, E2p7 is not positing a single order of relations (whether causal or conceptual) but two orders, which remain distinct only insofar as in the one case the reality of the *res* being ordered is merely objective, and in the other case this reality is a formal reality. Contrary to the correspondence reading, it does not posit an ill-defined relation of mirroring or isomorphism between the two orders, but a precisely defined relation of identity (of properties and degrees of reality). Moreover, on the proposed reading, whatever other
relations the order of things and the order of ideas may enter into (e.g. having structural similarities, such as the same number of immediate effects)\(^{69}\) these can be adequately explained as consequences of this fundamental relation of identity between things and the ideas that represent them.

It is worth noting here more generally that the corollary to E2p7 offers us a unique vantage point onto Spinoza's metaphysics as a whole. Typically this metaphysics gets introduced – as I have done above – by asserting that there are three fundamental building blocks to this metaphysics (substance, modes, attributes), defined so and so, and relating to each other in specific ways. This approach to understanding Spinoza's metaphysics is certainly correct; moreover, it is encouraged by Spinoza's own manner of presentation in the *Ethics*, which opens with definitions of such terms. But to consider Spinoza's metaphysics from this perspective is to consider it – to misappropriate a Heideggerian term – merely 'ontically', that is in terms of what this metaphysics says about *entities*\(^{70}\). But there is another, equally valid but neglected, road to take when thinking about the core of Spinoza's metaphysics: not in terms of the kinds of *entities* it allows but rather in terms of the kinds of *being* or *reality* it posits and how it relates them. And seen from this latter point of view, the crux of Spinoza's metaphysical framework as a whole is the claim that the fundamental 'structure' (for a lack of a better word) of all that is is given by the fundamental distinctness, but also the unity or inseparability, of formal and objective reality.

E2p7c is a place in Spinoza's writings in which this metaphysical picture emerges with particular clarity. But this same picture underlies Spinoza's fundamental definitions – of *causa sui*, substance and mode. All of them are articulated first of all in terms of what essentially belongs to the definiendum in its formal reality and secondly in its objective reality (rather than in terms of conception or thought more broadly, as some suggest\(^{71}\)).

\(^{69}\) See note 57.

\(^{70}\) Heidegger 1927.

\(^{71}\) E.g. Melamed 2012:43.
8. Read in the manner proposed above, neither E2p7 nor its corollary fit very well the standard gloss of Spinoza's 'parallelism doctrine' as a doctrine concerned with *inter-attribute* relations between things, i.e. on how things under one attribute (e.g. thought) relate to things under another attribute (e.g. extension).\(^72\) However, the interpretation I have proposed is also *not* intended to suggest that at the core of Spinoza's metaphysics there is a dualism of being and thought.\(^73\) For as we saw the corollary draws its key dividing line elsewhere: it compares formal and objective reality, not being and thought. And these two dualisms are orthogonal to each other: “thought” includes *both* the objective reality of the ideas' representational content, and the formal reality specific to thought.

However, attributes do become a key reference point in the scholium to E2p7s: it is there that the problem of inter-attribute relations between things indeed becomes a central concern; and the phrase *connexio rerum* acquires a new, attribute-relative, sense.\(^74\) Here is the crucial section of scholium:

we must recall here what we showed [NS: in the First Part], viz. that whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting an essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same [*una eademque*] substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also [*sic etiam*] a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways... Therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another [*unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus.*]. (E2p7s)

Like the corollary to E2p7 the scholium is concerned with *identity*. But it is no longer a matter of identity of things that differ in kinds of reality, as was the case in the corollary. Rather, the scholium

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\(^72\) This mismatch between the actual concerns of E2p7&c and concerns with inter-attribute relations has been noted before, cf. e.g. Deleuze 1990, Melamed 2012. For a gloss of Spinoza 'parallelism' in inter-attribute terms see e.g. Allison 1987:91f; Della Rocca 2008:316; Nadler 2006:123, 127; Newlands 2012:35.  
\(^73\) For this reading see Melamed 2012:42-3.  
\(^74\) I don't think that we should see E2p7s as the “more general” formulation of parallelism, as suggested by Della Rocca (2008:91).
asserts the numerical identity of things (again, both substance and modes) that differ in attribute,75 i.e. identity of things known by means of different fundamental concepts. So for example, although the knowledge of any “body” would require us to make use of the idea of “extension” (and perhaps also of ideas of “motion” or “rest” that this idea implies) and knowledge of any “mind” would require us to make use of the concept of “thought” (and perhaps also of ideas of “affirmation” or “negation” that this concept implies)76 nonetheless according to Spinoza every extended thing is also numerically identical to some thinking thing, and vice versa.

The scholium follows immediately on the corollary, and I suggest that its concerns are best understood from the perspective of the corollary, namely as attempts to clarify and supplement the corollary. In particular, given that for Spinoza formal reality consists of infinite kinds of being, the scholium describes the nature of the connexio rerum from this more fine-grained perspective, that is once the attribute-structure, so to speak, of formal reality is taken into account. More specifically, one of the scholium's tasks is to remind us that thought consists not just of the “absolutely infinite” objective reality described in the corollary, but also of a certain infinite and formally-real connexio rerum – that is of an order of causes with a specific kind of formal reality. This is a point about connexio rerum as it relates to thought specifically qua one among infinite attributes. But Spinoza also makes a more general point about the connexio rerum as it relates to all the attributes. Here the claim is that there is one and the same “connection of causes” under all the attributes. We are no longer approaching the idea of a connexio rerum here, as we were in the corollary, on the global scale of formal reality as an undifferentiated whole. Rather, we are talking about the connection of things as this notion relates to individual attributes.77

76 See E2p48s.
77 From the vantage point of the corollary, another task of the scholium is to elaborate on what it means to adequately represent a formally-real thing: it means to conceive it under all attributes.
Spinoza draws the conclusion that the *connexio rerum* is one and the same under all the attributes from the numerical identity of things under different attributes. That is to say, the numerical identity of things under different attributes – the fact that these things are “one and the same” – grounds the “sameness” of the *connexio rerum* across attributes. This is presumably because, as we noted earlier, for Spinoza the identity of things – what properties they have – depends on their causes. So if two things under different attributes are indeed “one and the same thing” then they must also share one and the same causal history: all their causes must be “one and the same” as well.

We can, in turn, reconstruct Spinoza's *argument* for the numerical identity of things under distinct attributes – the thesis that underpins the claim of the same order of causes across attributes – as follows. It is certainly true that we *represent* “thinking substance” and “extended substance” by means of concepts that, according to Spinoza, have nothing in common. But if we grant Spinoza that there can be only one substance, then we also must refer both of these representations of substance to one and the same entity in nature. That is, we must take “extended substance” and “thinking substance” to constitute two different names for one and the same thing. Hence we can conclude to the numerical identity of substance under different attributes. From the perspective of the corollary we can think of Spinoza as trying to caution us here about what conclusions about the “connection of things” we are entitled to draw on the basis of the *connexio idearum* as the latter was described by the corollary. The infinite substantial idea discussed in the corollary contains all metaphysically possible representations (of extended substance, thinking substance, minds, bodies, other kinds of modes which we, as knowers essentially of extension, cannot represent). The scholium cautions us that the infinitely diverse objective reality of this idea is not a sufficient ground to conclude that this idea refers to a numerical plurality of formally-real, and really distinct, things.

78 Cf. E3p2s (II/141): “These things are more clearly understood from what is said in 2p7s, viz. that the Mind and the Body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of Thought, now under the attribute of Extension. The result is [unde fit ut] that the order, or [sive] connection, of things is one” (my ital.).
From the identity of substance under different attributes the identity of its *modes* under different attributes follows directly, just as the scholium suggests. This is because modes are just the necessary properties of substance: what its essence must give rise to. So however we conceive of substance – whether as extended or as thinking – as long as we conceive of it adequately, the essence of substance will be seen to imply the very same things whatever the attribute – the very same causal ordering or *connexio rerum*.

9. In this paper I argued that what is usually referred to, quite misleadingly, as Spinoza's 'parallelism doctrine', can be seen as Spinoza's attempt to revive a core element of the ancient doctrine of metaphysical sympathy, the idea of a *connexio rerum*. I argued that two concepts in particular are central to this Spinozistic reconception of the *connexio rerum*, as articulated in E2p7 and associated passages: first, the Cartesian and Scholastic categories of “formal” and “objective” “reality”, and, secondly, the notion of identity. I proposed, more specifically, that for Spinoza the *connexio rerum*, or the order of things in nature, consists first and foremost in the identity of things existing with two different kinds of reality – formal reality as products of substance's power to act, objective reality as products of substance's power to think.

References


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79 Della Rocca proposes instead that the identity of modes follows from the PSR, insofar as there is (1) significant pressure toward the identity of a body and the mind representing this body, given their same causal “order and connection”; and (2) the lack of a possible explanation for their non-identity – the difference of attribute cannot ground non-identity given the explanatory closure of each attribute (2008:100-1). However, as regards (1), as we have seen, it is the identity that grounds the sameness of the causal connection, so this connection cannot be established prior to the identity. See also previous note.
McCracken, Ch. (1998). Knowledge of the soul, in Garber and Ayers, 796-832.